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Abstract in English 
In 1995, the municipality of Amsterdam introduced accountability policies for schools in 
primary education. Population statistics show a large increase of test scores in the decade after 
the introduction of the new urban policies. This paper assesses this increase in test scores by 
analyzing data of a large sample of schools including scores on the published test and scores on 
similar independently taken tests that are not published. Difference-in-differences estimates 
show that after the introduction of the accountability policies, test scores for both tests taken in 
grade 8 increased substantially more in Amsterdam than in the rest of the country and more than 
in a sample of Low SES students. Approximately 60 percent of the increase of the published 
test scores can be attributed to an increase in general skills and 40 percent to an increase in test-
specific skills. Test scores of pupils in lower grades also improved in Amsterdam. We do not 
find evidence for strategic behavior of schools. Although part of the gains in test scores might 
be test-specific, the accountability policies in Amsterdam seem to have succeeded in raising 
educational achievements in primary schools. 
 
Key words: accountability policy, educational performance, primary education 
JEL code: I20, I21, R00 
Abstract in Dutch 
Sinds 1995 is het gemeentelijk onderwijsbeleid in Amsterdam expliciet gericht op het 
verbeteren van de leerprestaties gemeten met de CITO-toets. Algemene statistieken laten een 
sterke stijging zien van de scores op de CITO-toets in Amsterdam. Deze studie onderzoekt deze 
stijging door Amsterdam te vergelijken met de rest van Nederland en met een steekproef van 
leerlingen met een lagere sociaaleconomische achtergrond. De studie gebruikt gegevens van het 
PRIMA-onderzoek dat zowel resultaten bevat van de CITO-toets als resultaten van toetsen voor 
taal en rekenen die zijn afgenomen binnen het PRIMA-project. De prestaties in Amsterdam zijn 
sterk verbeterd ten opzichte van die in de vergelijkingsgroepen, zowel op de CITO-toets als op 
de taal- en rekentoets in PRIMA. Ongeveer 60 % van de totale vooruitgang op de CITO-toets 
kan toegeschreven worden aan een algemene verbetering van de leervaardigheden en ongeveer 
40 % aan specifieke vaardigheden voor het maken van de CITO-test. De prestaties van kinderen 
in Amsterdam in lagere groepen zijn ook verbeterd. Er is geen bewijs gevonden voor strategisch 
gedrag van scholen zoals het uitsluiten van zwakke leerlingen van de toets. Hoewel een deel 
van de vooruitgang in Amsterdam mogelijk bestaat uit een verbetering van specifieke 
vaardigheden voor het maken van de CITO-toets, lijkt het beleid in Amsterdam wel degelijk 
geresulteerd te hebben in een verbetering van leerprestaties in het basisonderwijs.  
 
Steekwoorden: Gemeentelijk onderwijsbeleid, opbrengst gericht, CITO-toets   4 
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1  Introduction 
A remarkable case of urban educational policy can be found in the city of Amsterdam. Within a 
decade, schools in Amsterdam have increased test scores on average with more than 0.5 
standard deviation and surpassed the national average.
1 This strong increase in test scores 
happened after the introduction of a municipal education policy in 1995. This policy set targets 
for the level of test scores and focused on accountability of schools. Participation in a 
standardized national test (the CITO-test) was made compulsory for all primary schools in 
Amsterdam. The results of individual schools were published and schools received additional 
resources conditional on the improvements in performance. This paper takes a closer look at the 
increase in test scores in primary schools in Amsterdam.  
Although the population statistics suggest that the educational policies of the city of 
Amsterdam have been a great success, the recent economic literature on school accountability 
policies suggests that caution is needed. Several recent studies show that school accountability 
policies can increase test scores (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005, Jacob, 2005, Dee & Jacob, 
2009). However, strategic behavior of schools seems to be a fact of life. For instance, schools 
have raised test scores by classifying students as disabled (Figlio and Getzler, 2006) or 
increasing suspensions of low-performing students during the testing window (Figlio, 2006). 
Other strategic reactions that have been found are teacher cheating (Jacob and Levitt, 2003) and 
adding additional calories to the school menu on testing days (Figlio and Winicki, 2005). Jacob 
(2005) found that the test-based accountability policy in Chicago improved test scores but part 
of the improvement was related to an increase in test-specific skills. Figlio and Rouse (2006) 
show that the accountability policies in Florida only improved test scores in the high stakes 
grade. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of accountability policies in education. 
Whereas most previous studies focused on the US by exploiting variation between states, we 
provide evidence for a European country and use variation within the same education system. 
The accountability system studied in this paper differs from the typical high stakes testing 
systems in the US with relatively strong incentives for low performing schools and students. 
The urban policy in Amsterdam set school-specific short and long term targets depending on the 
socioeconomic composition of the school population and the performance in previous tests. As 
such, the accountability policy in Amsterdam aimed at all schools.  
We assess the increase in test scores in Amsterdam by analyzing data from a large country-
wide sample of schools. A special feature of these data is that it includes both the published test 
scores and scores on independently taken tests that were not published. The data include two 
samples: a representative sample for the whole country and a ‘Low SES sample’ with an 
oversampling of pupils with a lower socioeconomic background. The data enable us to compare 
 
1 The average test scores on the standardized national test increased from 529.4 in 1996 to 536.6 in 2005 (one standard 
deviation is equal to 10 points). Amsterdam includes approximately 200 primary schools.   8 
the change in performance of pupils in Amsterdam before and after the introduction of the new 
policies with the change in performance in these two samples. We estimate difference-in-
differences models for both the published and not published test scores. The estimates for the 
published test scores are informative about the robustness of the gains in test scores for changes 
in the composition of the student populations that might have occurred since the introduction of 
the new urban policies. The estimates for the test scores that have not been published learn 
whether the impact of the Amsterdam policies can be explained by an increase in test specific 
skills (‘teaching to the test’). In addition, our data include test scores of pupils in grade 2, 4 and 
6 (the published nationwide test is only taken in grade 8). An increase in test scores of the 
unpublished test, especially for pupils in grade 2, 4 or 6, would indicate that the new urban 
policies really improved learning skills, and not only the ability to perform well on the 
published test taken in grade 8. A second important feature of the data is that it enables us to 
analyze non-participation on the published test. The new urban policies might have induced 
schools to exclude weak students from taking the test. We are able to compare the exclusion 
decisions of schools in Amsterdam with the decisions of schools in the rest of the country.  
We find that the scores on the published test, which is only taken in grade 8, increased 0.5 
standard deviation more in Amsterdam than in the rest of the country and 0.4 standard deviation 
more than in the Low SES sample. Especially the performance of ‘regular Dutch pupils’ 
improved but we also observe an improvement for ethnic minority students. We also find that 
test scores on the unpublished tests increased in Amsterdam more than in the other two samples 
after the introduction of the policy. The improvement of performance is found for pupils in 
grade 8 but also for pupils in earlier grades. However, the size of the improvement is smaller for 
the unpublished test and smaller for pupils in earlier grades. Approximately 60 percent of the 
increase on the published test in grade 8 can be attributed to an increase in general skills and 40 
percent to an increase in test-specific skills. In addition, we do not find evidence that the 
increase in test scores is driven by the exclusion of pupils. Our overall assessment of the 
accountability policies in Amsterdam is positive. Although part of the gains in test scores might 
be test-specific the policies seem to have led to a substantial improvement of general skills of 
pupils in Amsterdam.   9 
2  The accountability policies in Amsterdam 
In the Dutch education system, the municipal education authorities are responsible for 
compliance with the compulsory education law, school buildings, the administration of public 
schools and education policies for disadvantaged groups. At the end of primary education, at the 
age of 12, pupils are tracked into different levels of secondary education. In the early nineties 
local education authorities in Amsterdam were concerned about the transition of pupils from 
primary to secondary education. Figures on drop out in the school year 1992/1993 showed that 
compared to the rest of the country drop out in Amsterdam was dramatically higher in all levels 
and grades of secondary education (Municipality of Amsterdam, 1994). The absence of 
admission rules for different tracks of secondary education was considered as an important 
factor for these high dropout rates. In the school year 1994/95, a so-called ‘School Choice 
Procedure’ was introduced which included various steps to improve the transition from primary 
to secondary education (Visser, 2003). One of these steps was that pupils should take a test at 
the end of primary education. The outcome of this test should be used as a second indicator of 
the ability of the pupil. The first indicator was the advice of the principal of the primary school 
about the secondary track. This ‘School Choice Procedure’, which made the use of standardized 
tests at the end of primary education acceptable for schools, preceded and became part of the 
broader municipal education policies that were introduced since 1995. The municipal 
accountability policies consisted of four-year plans called ‘Towards Better Results’ (Naar 
betere resultaten). The first four-year plan, focused on the period 1995-1998, can be seen as an 
initial phase in which ideas were introduced such as setting targets and monitoring of 
performance. The second plan, which focused on the period 1998-2002, was much more 
explicit in setting targets, using incentives and holding schools accountable for student 
performance. With the introduction of the second plan, the accountability components became 
the central elements of the urban educational policy. It has been suggested that the responsible 
alderman was inspired by ideas about public sector management through output steering from 
the new central government (Visser, 2003). 
 For the period 1995-1998, the local education authorities in Amsterdam reached an 
agreement with schools which was laid down in the plan ‘Towards better results’ (Naar betere 
resultaten). This plan included a general target and several activities. The general target was to 
raise the performance of pupils towards the national average. The first step in the new plan was 
the measurement of the performance of primary schools which suggests that the formulation of 
the target was not based on a quantitative assessment of performance. Visser (2003) notes that 
there was a general feeling that primary schools in Amsterdam were underperforming. The 
dramatic dropout rates in secondary education might have contributed to this feeling. It was 
agreed that from the school year 1995-1996 onwards the performance of pupils at the end of 
primary education would be measured in such a way that schools in Amsterdam could be 
compared with each other and with the rest of the country. At the start in 1996, 178 out of 207   10 
schools in Amsterdam participated in the nationwide CITO test. Only the so-called Montessori 
schools refused to participate because of some basic objections against the CITO-test. However, 
these schools started participating in the school year 1997-1998. In 1996 schools in Amsterdam 
scored on average 5 points below the national average on the CITO test. In 1997, nearly the 
same number of schools in Amsterdam participated (177). The average score in Amsterdam was 
4.6 points below the national average. The average scores of Amsterdam and the rest of the 
country were published in the yearly report over 1997 by the statistics agency of Amsterdam 
(Statistics Amsterdam, 1998). To our knowledge, this is the first publication in which the 
performance of schools in Amsterdam has been compared with the performance of schools in 
the rest of the country. Note that this is a comparison of the average score of Amsterdam with 
the average score in the rest of the country without any reference to the performance of 
individual schools. Another important component of the plan was the introduction of the use of 
test score ranges (band widths) for the assignment of pupils to different tracks in secondary 
education in the school year 1996-1997. These band widths created more transparency in the 
use of admission rules for different tracks of secondary education.  
The municipality of Amsterdam reached a second agreement with schools and city districts 
for the period 1998-2002 ( ‘Towards better results-II’ (Naar betere resultaten II)).
2  
This agreement was directly related to a restructuring of the governmental policies for 
disadvantaged groups that started in August 1998 (the so-called GOA-policy). A 
decentralization of policies towards municipal authorities was thought to be more effective in 
improving educational achievements of disadvantaged pupils at the local level. This 
restructuring provided Amsterdam with funds that were used in the second agreement. The new 
agreement extended the previous four-year plan with school specific performance targets and 
incentives. A short term target was formulated as increasing scores on the nationwide CITO-test 
for pupils in grade 8 of primary education to 532.7 points in the years 1999-2001. The long 
term target was set as scoring on average 534.6 points, which was the national average of 1998. 
In addition, specific targets were formulated for individual schools depending on their 
performance in the previous years and the socioeconomic composition of the school population 
measured in seven categories. For schools that in the previous three years scored below the 
average of their socioeconomic category, the target was set at the national average for this 
category of schools. For schools that already scored at the national average, the target was set as 
increasing the average scores with 2.5 points. Schools that already scored 2.5 points higher than 
the national average at least had to consolidate this performance. For reaching these targets the 
project included the following activities for schools in primary education: 
 
2 Municipality of Amsterdam, 1998, Governance agreement ‘Towards better results 1998-2002’ (Bestuursovereenkomst 
“Naar betere resultaten 1998-2002”). 
   11 
•  All schools would participate each year in the CITO test for grade 8, this test would be used as 
an indicator for measuring school quality and performance; 
•  All schools would start to use systems for following the performance of individual students 
during primary education and use this system for yearly monitoring of the performance at the 
individual, group or school level; 
•  Each school would formulate a plan for the period 1998-2002 about the measures that would be 
taken for reaching the goals about improvement of the test scores; 
•  Each school would follow the municipal procedures for the assignment of pupils to different 
tracks in secondary education.  
 
The municipality allocated additional funds to schools to carry out these activities. The funds 
obtained from the governmental GOA-policies were used. Each year, Amsterdam obtained 
approximately 12 million guilders from the GOA-funds, which totaled 175 million guilders for 
the whole country. At the school level this translated into on average 60,000 guilders for each 
school in Amsterdam (approximately 30,000 $ in 2000). The GOA-funds were supplemented 
with municipal resources. The allocation of the funds was made conditional on the 
implementation of the agreed activities and the realizations of the goals in each year. The plan 
formulated explicitly the rules for the allocation of funds which included a description of 
situations in which schools would not receive additional resources for disadvantaged pupils.  
For instance, schools that would not reach the targets and had not implemented the activities as 
agreed in their school plan would not receive the additional funds in the next school year. If the 
activities were implemented in the next year schools would again get the right to obtain the 
additional funds.  
In 2001, nearly all schools (194 out of 195) participated in the CITO-test. In 2004 the project 
‘Towards better result’ became part of a broader policy program for education and youth 
(Lokaal Onderwijs en Jeugdplan (LOJP). The scores on the CITO-test remained the main focus 
point.  
 
Accountability policies in the rest of the country 
Before 2000, there was no official accountability policy for The Netherlands as a whole. 
Although the Inspectorate of Education inspected schools and composed school reports, those 
reports were not available to the public. In 1998, several Dutch newspapers demanded the 
release of information about school performance. The newspapers used this information to 
compose ranking lists of secondary schools mainly located in the G4 and few other large cities.
3 
In the following years secondary schools in other Dutch areas were also included in these 
rankings. In addition, newspapers started to publish rankings of schools in primary education. 
The fact that these lists were getting extensive public attention increased pressure on the 
 
3 The G4 cities are Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht.   12 
Inspectorate to make more information about schools available to the public. In 2003, the 
Inspectorate introduced on its website the “quality card”, which organizes information about a 
school in a compact and easily understandable manner. Before the introduction of the quality 
card, parents would have to download reports and read through them in order to find out how 
well a school fares on the CITO test.    13 
3  Empirical strategy 
Our main approach for assessing the effect of the municipal accountability policies of 
Amsterdam is to estimate standard difference-in-differences (DD) models. The first difference 
is the change in performance of pupils in Amsterdam before and after the introduction of the 
accountability policies. If pupils in Amsterdam perform better after the introduction of these 
policies this might be an effect of these policies. However, the improvement in performance 
might also be the result of other factors that changed in Dutch education during these years. To 
control for these other factors we use a second difference, which is the change in performance 
in a control group. This DD-approach rests on the assumption that the before-after difference 
for the control group would have been the before-after difference for the treated group in the 
absence of the reform. With the DD approach the treatment effect (β ) of the Amsterdam 
accountability policies can be found as:  








after Y Y Y Y − − − = β   (3.1) 
with 
A
after Y is the performance of pupils in Amsterdam after the implementation of the 
accountability policies , 
A
before Y  is the performance of pupils in Amsterdam before the 
implementation of the accountability policies, 
C
after Y and 
C
before Y is the performance of pupils in 
the control group after and before the implementation of the Amsterdam policies. We estimate 
the treatment effect with a regression model which has the following form: 
ist t s ist ist ist ist f f X T A T A Y ε β β β β β + + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 . ,  (3.2) 
where  ist Y is the performance on test Y of pupil i in school s in year t, A is a dummy which has 
value 1 if the person is a pupil in Amsterdam and value 0 if the person is a pupil in the control 
group (C), T is a dummy which has value 1 if the pupil took the performance test after the 
implementation of the Amsterdam policies and value 0 if the pupil took the performance test 
before the implementation of the Amsterdam policies, X is a vector of control variables,  s f and 
t f are fixed effects for school and year of the survey,  ist ε is a person specific error term, and 
β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The parameter of primary interest is  3 β which is 
the difference-in-differences estimator.  
The data used in the analysis come from the so-called PRIMA-project in Dutch primary 
education (see next section). This project consists of two samples of schools. The first sample is 
representative for the Netherlands, the second sample includes an oversampling of pupils with a 
lower socioeconomic background. In our main estimation models we use these two samples as 
control groups, which means that the variable A has three categories. As the school population 
in Amsterdam includes large proportion of low SES pupils the second sample might be the most 
appropriate control group. The advantage of using these two control groups is that they measure   14 
the nationwide change in performance for regular pupils and for pupils with lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds. The disadvantage is that these two samples might not pick up 
changes that occurred in the Dutch large cities. Therefore, we will also compare the change in 
educational performance in Amsterdam with the change in performance in the other three large 
Dutch cities ((Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). Unfortunately, the number of schools from 
these cities decreased strongly in the last surveys. We therefore only use these schools for our 
robustness analyses. We estimated the standard DD-models for both the published test scores 
(CITO-test) and for the unpublished test scores (tests from the PRIMA-project). In addition, we 
also use DD-models for the analysis of the strategic behavior of schools. 
An important issue in the analysis is the timing of the policies in relation to the observation 
window of our data. The first plan ‘Towards better results’ started in August 1995 and the 
second plan started in August 1998 (see section 2). The first plan was the initial phase of the 
new policies, the second plan set clear targets and was much more explicit about activities. The 
observation window of our main data stretches from early 1995 to early 2005 and includes 
biannual test scores (see next section). This means that the scores on the test taken in early 1995 
are unlikely to be affected by the new policies. The scores on the test taken in early 1997 come 
from the initial phase of the new policies. It seems that the accountability policies really took 
form in the second plan. Therefore, in the difference-in-differences models we define the survey 
years 1995 and 1997 as the years before the treatment (T=0) and the survey years 1999, 2001, 
2003 and 2005 as the treatment year (T=1).  
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4  Data 
The data we use in the analysis were available from the longitudinal PRIMA survey. This 
biannual survey data is used to analyze the educational strategies and performance of the 
primary education system in the Netherlands (Driessen, van Lange, Vierke, 2004; Driessen, van 
Lange, Oudenhoven, 1994).We used the first six waves of the PRIMA survey including data on 
pupils, parents, teachers and schools from the school years 1994-95, 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-
01, 2002-03 and 2004-05. The PRIMA project consists of a panel of approximately 60,000 
pupils in 600 schools. The participation in the project is voluntary. The main sample, which 
includes approximately 420 schools, is called the reference sample. An additional sample 
includes 180 schools for the over-sampling of pupils with a lower socioeconomic background 
(the Low SES sample). After each wave of the project some schools drop out and some new 
schools are included. However, there are no significant differences between the schools that 
drop out and the schools that remain in the project (Roeleveld and Vierke, 2003). Within each 
school, pupils in grades 2, 4, 6 and 8 (average age: 6, 8, 10, 12 years) are tested in language and 
arithmetic. Additionally, information on the social background is collected, and teachers are 
asked about the behaviour of the child in school. The nationwide CITO-test is taken 
independently from the PRIMA-project. At the end of the school year schools were asked to 
report the score of their pupils and these scores were added to the PRIMA data.   
Dependent variables 
The main dependent variables in the analysis are the scores on the CITO-test and the scores on 
the PRIMA-tests in language and arithmetic. The CITO-test is the most important nationwide 
test administered by over 80% of primary schools. The CITO-test is not compulsory. Every 
year, usually in February, pupils in their final year of primary education (grade 8, age 12) take 
the so-called Eindtoets Basisonderwijs test (CITO-test). The standardized test covers four areas:  
•  Language: spelling, writing, reading, and vocabulary;  
•  Arithmetic: understanding of numbers, mental arithmetic, percentages, fractions, dealing with 
measures, weights, money, and time;  
•  Information processing: use of texts, and other information sources, reading and understanding 
of tables, graphs, and maps;  
•  World orientation (optional): applying knowledge in the fields of geography, history, biology, 
science, and form of government.  
 
The complete test consists of over 200 multiple-choice questions. The tests are comparable 
across years. CITO distinguishes five subtests. Unfortunately, our data do not contain the scores 
for the subtests of 1995. Therefore, we only analyze scores on the total test. Testing takes place 
over a period of three days in February. The outcome of the test is important for both pupils and   16 
schools. Pupils’ scores are used to help assign pupils to different levels of secondary education. 
The average scores of schools’ pupils are used to judge the quality of primary schools. Parents 
use this information when choosing a primary school for their children. Every year the test 
receives considerable media attention, with national newspapers and television reporting on the 
most recent results. The primary aim of the CITO-test is to predict student success in secondary 
education.  
The PRIMA-tests for languages and arithmetic were also developed by the CITO group but 
taken as part of the PRIMA-project (Kamphuis, Mulder, Vierke, Overmaat, Koopman, 1998). 
The language test for children in second grade, which is equivalent to infant school, measures 
the understanding of words and concepts. The arithmetic test for these children focuses on the 
sorting of objects. These tests can be taken in class. The test for children in grades 4, 6 and 8 all 
come from a system for following pupil achievements in primary education developed by the 
CITO group. The aim of these tests is to observe to which extend students master various 
elements of the curriculum. The tests for the same grade levels are identical each year. This 
ensures that the comparison of achievement levels over time is possible. The scores are also 
comparable between grades. The scales of the raw scores for language and arithmetic have no 
clear meaning. We have therefore opted to transform these scores for each test and each grade 
into wave specific standardized scores, having mean zero and standard deviation one. It should 
be noted that the comparability over time is hampered by other differences between waves. In 
the first wave, tests were taken early in the school year. In the second wave, tests were taken 
halfway through the school year. In the first two waves, tests were administered by an external 
examiner, while in the third wave the class teacher administered the tests. Because these 
differences may affect our findings we control for the year of the survey in all regressions.  
Explanatory variables 
All schools in the PRIMA-project have a school specific ID but the location of the schools 
cannot be identified from this ID. We obtained additional information on the municipality of the 
schools for identifying schools in Amsterdam and in the other three large Dutch cities 
(Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht). At the individual level we control for gender, age (in survey 
year, measured in days) and the pupil’s so-called weight factor (subsidy factor) assigned by the 
funding scheme for primary schools. The Dutch funding scheme for primary schools 
distinguishes several groups of disadvantaged pupils. The most important groups are Dutch 
pupils with lower educated parents and pupils with an ethnic minority background. Pupils not 
belonging to a disadvantaged group enter the funding scheme with a weight factor equal to 
unity. Dutch pupils of poorly educated parents have a weight equal to 1.25 and pupils from an 
ethnic minority have a weight factor of 1.9. Schools receive 25 % additional funding for pupils   17 
with a weight of 1.25, and 90% additional funding for these pupils with a weight of 1.90. 
Hence, this weight factor indicates the socio-economic background of the pupils.
4   
Main estimation sample 
Our main estimation sample consists of pupils in grade 8 of primary education. Table 4.1 shows 
sample statistics of the main variables for the reference sample (column (1)), the Low SES 
sample (column (2)) and for Amsterdam (column (3)). 
Table 4.1  Sample statistics of main estimation sample of pupils in grade 8 in 1995-2005 (standard 
deviations in brackets) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Reference Sample  Low SES Sample  Amsterdam 
       
CITO score  534.3 (10.0)  529.3 (10.4)  529.9 (10.6) 
Participation (%)  63.7  59.5  61.6 
       
PRIMA       
Math score  0.12 (0.99)  − 0.23 (0.98)  − 0.24 (0.97) 
Language score  0.16 (0.99)  − 0.33 (0.98)  − 0.36 (0.94) 
       
Girl (%)  49.7  50.8  52.3 
Age at test (years)  11.9  12.0  12.0 
       
Subsidy factor (%)       
1.0  59.7  19.7  21.1 
1.25  25.2  28.8  8.8 
1.9  10.7  45.2  63.5 
missing  3.8  5.2  6.6 
       
Observations (schools)  54,169 (993)  21,534 (421)  5,698 (77) 
 
Note: Not shown are subsidy factors 1.4 and 1.7 which include small proportions. 
 
The main estimation sample consists of 81,401 pupils in 1,491 schools. The number of schools 
is more than 600 because after each wave schools drop out and new schools are included. The 
average scores on the CITO-test and on both PRIMA-tests are quite similar for pupils in 
Amsterdam and pupils in the Low SES sample, and clearly below the scores of pupils in the 
reference sample. The statistics for the subsidy factor show that there are major differences in 
the socio-economic background of pupils in Amsterdam and pupils in the Low SES sample 
compared to pupils in the reference sample, indicated by the subsidy factor. Although the Low 
SES sample is more comparable to the Amsterdam sample the former includes higher 
proportions of Dutch pupils with low educated parents (1.25) and smaller proportion of pupils 
from ethnic minorities (1.9). The sample of Amsterdam has been constructed from the two other 
samples. Three out of four pupils in the total sample of Amsterdam are drawn from the Low 
 
4 The PRIMA-project includes additional variables about the socioeconomic background of the pupils. However, these 
variables are not consistently measured over time. In addition, the school fixed effects in our models control for differences 
in the socioeconomic composition of the school population.    18 
SES sample and one out of four pupils from the reference sample. Table A.1 in the appendix 
shows the averages of the covariates for each survey year.  
In addition to the main estimation sample of pupils in grade 8, we also analyze data of 
pupils in grade 2, 4 and 6. These pupils did not participate in the CITO-test but did participate 
in the PRIMA-tests on math and language. Moreover, we use data from the so-called LEO-
project, which is the predecessor of the PRIMA-project. The LEO-project, which collected data 
in 1988 and 1990, does not include the CITO-test but includes scores on tests for math and 
language similar to the tests used in PRIMA. Unfortunately, there is no information available on 
the location of the schools. However, we can identify schools in LEO that also participated in 
PRIMA. For both 1988 and 1990 we can identify 20 schools in Amsterdam. We use the data 
from the LEO-project to investigate the long term trend (Table 4.3). 
Trends in unadjusted scores of the population and the sample 
A comparison of the unadjusted scores on the CITO test in our samples with the scores from 
population statistics is shown in Table 4.2. The table shows the means for the population, the 
reference sample and the Low SES sample.  
Table 4.2  CITO-scores in the population and in the PRIMA-samples (means) 
CITO  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005 
             
The Netherlands             
Population  534.4*  534.5  534.2  534.9  534.7  534.5 
Reference sample  534.9  534.5  534.1  534.4  534.7  533.5 
Low SES sample  528.9  528.9  528.8  530.0  529.9  529.5 
             
Amsterdam             
Population  529.4*  529.9  531.7  533.3  533.1  536.6** 
             
Sample  525.7  528.2  531.0  530.9  531.2  531.1 
 
* Measured in 1996; 1995 is not available; ** Without pupils with a low school advice;  
 
The first rows in table 4.2 show that the average CITO scores in the Netherlands are quite 
constant, both in the population and in the two samples. The average scores in the Low SES 
sample are lower due to the oversampling of disadvantaged pupils. The CITO-scores of pupils 
in Amsterdam strongly increase according to the population statistics. Between 1997 and 2003 
we observe an increase of 3.2 points. The scores for 2005 probably are inflated by the exclusion 
of weak pupils. The average scores in our ‘Amsterdam’ sample are lower because 75 % of the 
Amsterdam sample is drawn from the Low SES sample. Since 1997 we observe an increase of 
approximately 3.0 CITO-points. The unadjusted scores also suggest an increase of the CITO-
scores between 1995 and 1997.  
    19 
Trends in adjusted test scores in Amsterdam and in the rest of the country 
For a first impression of the effect of the Amsterdam policies we compare the trend in test 
scores in Amsterdam with the trend in the two samples. We investigated whether the trend in 
the three test scores in Amsterdam diverged from the trend in the other two samples by 
estimating difference-in-differences models that include interaction of the year of survey and a 
dummy for Amsterdam and the full set of controls (age, age squared, subsidy factor, school 
fixed effects):  
ist s ist ist ist ist f X Year A Year A Y ε β β β β β + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 . . ,  (4.1) 
Table 4.3 shows the estimates for the interaction variables in models for the CITO-test and the 
tests from the PRIMA-project. For the latter tests we also include data from the LEO-project 
which extends the observation window to 1988. Unfortunately, the LEO-project does not 
include scores on the CITO-tests.  
Table 4.3  Estimates of the changes in average scores in Amsterdam in grade 8 compared to the 
countrywide change by year of survey (1997=0) 
  1988  1990  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005 
CITO                 
Amsterdam  n.a.  n.a.  0.003  0.0  0.543  0.461  0.461  0.492 
      (0.112)  0.0  (0.092)***  (0.070)***  (0.084)***  (0.117)*** 
Low SES  n.a.  n.a.  0.070  0.0  0.133  0.139  0.067  0.090 
      (0.057)  0.0  (0.051)***  (0.041)***  (0.054)  (0.060) 
Observations                50840 
                 
Math                 
Amsterdam  0.009  -0.159  -0.127  0.0  0.188  0.298  0.196  0.319 
  (0.099)  (0.102)  (0.083)  0.0  (0.088)**  (0.072)***  (0.090)**  (0.096)*** 
Low SES  − 0.172  − 0.125  − 0.038  0.0  − 0.041  0.002  − 0.095  − 0.023 
  (0.049)***  (0.047)***  (0.041)  0.0  (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.051)*  (0.061) 
Observations                97274 
Language                 
                 
Amsterdam  0.069  -0.129  -0.005  0.0  0.118  0.290  0.257  0.295 
  (0.088)  (0.084)  (0.060)  0.0  (0.058)**  (0.048)***  (0.065)***  (0.064)*** 
Low SES  − 0.149  − 0.093  − 0.048  0.0  − 0.034  0.014  − 0.041  − 0.051 
  (0.037)***  (0.034)***  (0.029)*  0.0  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
Observations                99801 
 
Note: DD-estimates of the trend in test scores from regression models controlling for gender, subsidy factor, age and age squared, 
school fixed effects; standard errors adjusted for clustering at school year level in brackets. 
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The estimates in table 4.3 show that test scores in Amsterdam did not diverge from the trend in 
the Netherlands until 1997. However, from 1999 onwards we observe a clear improvement of 
the scores on all three tests compared to the general trend. This is the period of the second 
agreement between the schools and the municipality (Towards better results-II). For the Low 
SES sample we observe no improvement on the CITO-test and some improvement between the 
LEO-project (1988 and 1990) and the PRIMA-project that started in 1995.  
In the next sections, we will only use the data from the PRIMA-project because of the 
consistency in the measurement of the three tests and the missing information on the location of 
schools in the LEO-project.   21 
5  The effect of the urban policies on the published test 
As a first step in the assessment of the increase in test scores in Amsterdam we analyze changes 
on the published test scores from the nationwide CITO-test taken by pupils in grade 8. We 
estimate difference-in-differences models of the effect of the Amsterdam policies on the scores 
of the CITO-test using different specifications for equation (2). The first specification in Table 
5.1 (column (1)) does not include student characteristics or school fixed effects. As such, this 
specification can be seen as the closest proxy for the population statistic. This estimate is 
informative about possible sampling bias. The next two specifications (column (2) and (3)) 
show the robustness of the estimates for including different sets of controls. Hence, these 
estimates control for changes in the composition of the sample of students that took the test. 
The first three columns of Table 5.1 show the effects on the standardized CITO-test, the last 
column shows the effect on the CITO-score measured in points (500-550). The top panel shows 
the estimates for the whole sample of schools that participated in the CITO test, the bottom 
panel shows the estimates for the reference sample. Standard errors are corrected for clustering 
at the school year level. 
Table 5.1  Table 5.1 Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam policy on the CITO -
test 
                             Standardized CITO  CITO 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Amsterdam  0.454  0.509  0.490  5.189 
  (0.090)***  (0.091)***  (0.070)***  (0.744)*** 
Low SES sample  0.124  0.137  0.089  1.003 
  (0.045)***  (0.042)***  (0.039)**  (0.405)** 
N  50840  50840  50840  50840 
Controls         
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student characteristics  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
 
Note: Column (1) controls for the cohort year, column (2) also controls for gender, age, age squared and subsidy factor, column (3) and 
(4) also include a school fixed effect. 
 
The difference-in-differences estimates in column (1) show that test scores in Amsterdam 
increased with approximately 0.5 standard deviation after the introduction of the new urban 
policy. This estimate is very similar to the population statistic suggesting that sampling bias is 
not a serious concern. Including additional controls, such as the subsidy factor, slightly 
increases the estimates. The estimated increase corresponds to approximately 5-6 CITO-points 
(column (4) and (5)). The estimates in the bottom panel, using the reference sample, show a 
similar pattern. Test scores of pupils in Amsterdam increased with 0.4 to 0.5 standard deviation 
more than test scores of pupils in the rest of country. This suggests that the estimates are robust 
for changes in the composition of the sample of test takers. The second row in table 5.1 shows   22 
that the performance of low SES students in the Netherlands improved with approximately 0.1 
standard deviation. Hence, compared to this groups of students the performance in Amsterdam 
improved with 0.4 standard deviation.  
The heterogeneity of the effects of the urban policy 
Previous studies showed that the effects of accountability policies might differ between types of 
students and schools. For instance, Jacob (2005) finds that the accountability policy in Chicago 
especially affected marginal students and schools. This is consistent with the design of the 
policy in Chicago that imposed greater incentives on low-performing schools and students. The 
Amsterdam policy did not include clear differential incentives. However, schools might have 
chosen to focus their efforts on specific groups of students, for instance ethnic minorities or low 
performing students. We examined the heterogeneity of the effects of the urban policy by 
comparing the effects for different socioeconomic groups and by estimating quantile 
regressions (Table 5.2).
5 The top panel of table 5.2 shows the estimates of the main model 
(column (3) of Table 5.1) in which the urban policy is interacted with the subsidy factor based 
on the socioeconomic background of the pupils. The bottom panel shows the estimation results 
of the main model for various quantiles of the test score distribution.  
Table 5.2  Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam policy on the standardized 
CITO –test for socioeconomic groups and quantiles of the test score distribution 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Quantile  10 %  25 %  50 %  75 %  90 % 
Amsterdam  0.477  0.549  0.559  0.614  0.418 
  (0.067)***  (0.058)***  (0.051)***  (0.047)***  (0.041)*** 
Low SES sample  0.138  0.166  0.131  0.122  0.059 
  (0.038)***  (0.033)***  (0.029)***  (0.026)***  (0.023)** 
N  50840  50840  50840  50840  50840 
           
    Regular Dutch  Low educated  Ethnic minority   
Amsterdam*socio-economic group  0.510  0.160  0.500     
    (0.116)***  (0.119)  (0.080)***   
Low SES * socioeconomic group  -0.033  -0.040  0.212     
    (0.059)  (0.045)  (0.048)***   
N        50840   
 
Note: The top panel shows estimates of quantile regressions for 5 quantiles. The bottom panel shows estimates of an interaction of 
subsidy factor with Amsterdam or Low SES sample from the main model in column (3) of table 5.1.  
 
 
5 Unfortunately, we cannot investigate the heterogeneity of the effect of policy between schools in Amsterdam because of 
the limited number of schools that participated in more than one survey of the PRIMA-project.    23 
The top panel shows that the Amsterdam policies affected the performance of pupils in all 
quantiles of the test score distribution. At the tales of the distribution the size of the estimates is 
slightly lower. For the low SES sample the estimates are quite similar for all quantiles, but 
smaller in the highest quantile. The bottom panel shows that the improvement in test scores in 
Amsterdam is similar for the two largest groups in Amsterdam: the regular Dutch pupils and for 
ethnic minorities. For pupils with lower educated Dutch parents the estimate is statistically not 
significant. For the Low SES sample we find only an improvement of test scores for students 
from ethnic minorities. This suggest that the total improvement in Amsterdam compared to the 
other two samples is primary driven by the regular Dutch pupils and to a lesser extent by 
students from ethnic minorities.    24   25 
6  Teaching to the test? 
One of the main lessons from the recent economic literature on school accountability is that 
increases in test scores might be the result of strategic reactions of schools (Jacob, 2005). For 
instance, schools might practice a lot with tests from previous years. This might increase test-
specific skills but might not improve general skills. This is often labeled as ‘teaching-to-the-
test’. In this section we investigate this key question for the assessment of the increase in test 
scores in Amsterdam in two ways. First, we investigate the change in performance of pupils in 
Amsterdam on a second independent test (the PRIMA-test). If the accountability policies 
improved the general skills of pupils we expect the increase in scores on the CITO-test to be 
reflected in an increase of scores on the PRIMA-test. Second, we analyse the change in 
educational performance of pupils in earlier grades. The accountability policies only set targets 
for the performance of pupils in grade 8.  
6.1  The effect of the urban policy on the unpublished tests 
We investigate the change in learning abilities by estimating difference-in-differences models 
on scores on specific tests from the PRIMA-project. The key difference is that these tests have 
not been published and do not play a role in the accountability policies. Table 6.1 shows the 
estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam accountability polices on the tests from the PRIMA 
project taken in grade 8. The first three columns show the estimates for the math test using 
different sets of controls, the last three columns show the estimates for the language test. The 
top panel shows the estimates for the sample of schools that participated in the CITO test. 
Hence, this sample is comparable to the sample used in Table 5.1. The bottom panel shows the 
estimates for the total sample of the PRIMA-project. 
When using the sample of ‘CITO-participants’ we find for both (unpublished) tests that the 
scores in Amsterdam increased with approximately 0.3 standard deviation compared to the 
change in the rest of the country. The sample of CITO-participants consists of schools that 
participated in the CITO-test and also includes scores of pupils that did not participate in the 
CITO-test. If we restrict the sample to pupils that participated in the CITO-test we find similar 
results. The results for the sample of PRIMA-participants are also similar. For the pupils in the 
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Table 6.1  Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam policy on the PRIMA tests in 
math and language in grade  
                     PRIMA Math                     PRIMA Language 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CITO participants              
Amsterdam  0.286  0.315  0.373  0.319  0.366  0.327 
  (0.084)***  (0.084)***  (0.073)***  (0.068)***  (0.058)***  (0.056)*** 
Low SES sample  0.022  0.033  -0.072  0.072  0.082  0.003 
  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.045)  (0.039)*  (0.031)***  (0.031) 
N  50058  50058  50058  51858  51858  51858 
             
PRIMA participants             
Amsterdam  0.267  0.278  0.308  0.296  0.311  0.239 
  (0.073)***  (0.071)***  (0.067)***  (0.063)***  (0.047)***  (0.049)*** 
Low SES sample  0.074  0.089  − 0.010  0.085  0.098  0.021 
  (0.037)**  (0.035)**  (0.032)  (0.031)***  (0.024)***  (0.024) 
N  74726  74726  74726  77246  77246  77246 
             
Controls             
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student characteristics  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
School fixed effect  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
 
Note: Column (1) and (4) control for year dummies, column (2) and (5) also control for gender, age, age squared and subsidy factor, 
column (3) and (6) also include a school fixed effect. 
 
General skills versus test-specific skills 
The improvement of pupils in Amsterdam on the PRIMA-tests is in line with the findings on 
the change in performance on the CITO-test, and suggests that the improvement of Amsterdam 
pupils on the CITO-test reflects an improvement of general skills. We decomposed the increase 
of scores on the CITO-test in a test-specific and a general component by including the PRIMA-
test scores as controls in the models of the previous section. The estimates of the regression on 
the standardized score on the CITO-test are shown in table 6.2. Including the PRIMA-test 
scores as controls reduces the sample due to missing values on these tests. Column (4) re-
estimates the main model of table 5.1 (column (3)) using this smaller sample. 
 
The estimates for the total sample suggest that approximately 60 percent of the total increase in 
performance on the CITO-test score is driven by an increase in general skills and 40 % by an 
increase in test-specific skills. The estimates for the reference sample suggest that more than 80 
percent can be attributed to an increase in general skills. For the Low SES sample the inclusion 
of the PRIMA test scores does hardly change the estimates. This suggests that the total 
improvement for this sample is test-specific.  
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Table 6.2  Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam policy on the CITO –test 
controlling for the scores on the PRIMA-tests 
                             Standardized CITO 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Amsterdam  0.193  0.210  0.194  0.527 
         
  (0.044)***  (0.045)***  (0.053)***  (0.073)*** 
Low SES sample  0.099  0.104  0.116  0.077 
  (0.027)***  (0.027)***  (0.028)***  (0.040)* 
N  46364  46364  46364  46364 
Controls         
PRIMA test scores  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student characteristics  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No 
 
Note: Column (1) controls for the cohort year, type of sample and G3 city, column (2) also controls for gender, age, age squared and 
subsidy factor, column (3) and (4) also include a school fixed effect. 
 
 
6.2  The performance of pupils in grade 2, 4 and 6 
Previous research has found that accountability policies only improved test scores in the high 
stakes grade (Figlio and Rouse, 2006). This finding might indicate teaching to the test. The 
PRIMA project also measures the cognitive ability of pupils in grade 2, 4 and 6. This provides 
the opportunity to investigate whether the Amsterdam policies also had an effect on the 
performance in earlier grades. If the performance of pupils in these grades improved it seems 
not likely that this improvement is the result of special practicing for taking the CITO-test in 
grade 8. Table 6.3 shows the estimates from DD-models similar to column (2) and (3) of Table 
6.1. The left panel shows the estimated effect on scores in math, the right panel shows the 
estimates for languages. We show the results for the pooled sample of grade 2, 4 and 6 while 
controlling for grade, and the results for the separate grades. 
The results in Table 6.3 indicate that the accountability policies in Amsterdam not only 
increased test scores of pupils in grade 8 but also in earlier grades. For the pooled sample the 
test scores of pupils in Amsterdam increased 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviation more than in the rest 
of the country. For the Low SES sample we observe a decrease of test scores of approximately 
0.1 standard deviation in math and no improvement in language. For the separate grades all 
point estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam polices are positive but not all estimates are 
statistically significant. For the low SES sample there seems to be a deterioration of test scores.  
Although the size of the improvement in performance is smaller than the improvement in 
grade 8 these estimates suggest that the Amsterdam policies also increased the general skills of 
pupils in earlier grades.  
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Table 6.3  Estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam policies on pupils in grade 2, 4 and 6 
                             Math                             Language 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Grade 2-6         
Amsterdam  0.181  0.133  0.161  0.119 
  (0.044)***  (0.054)**  (0.052)***  (0.049)** 
Low SES  − 0.004  − 0.097  0.055  − 0.017 
  (0.023)  (0.022)***  (0.022)**  (0.019) 
N  248893  248893  250282  250282 
Grade 2         
Amsterdam  0.285  0.228  0.171  0.129 
  (0.071)***  (0.101)**  (0.080)**  (0.095) 
Low SES  0.066  − 0.006  0.040  − 0.039 
  (0.035)*  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.034) 
N  85765  85765  85217  85217 
Grade 4         
Amsterdam  0.089  0.101  0.106  0.056 
  (0.066)  (0.077)  (0.068)  (0.067) 
Low SES  − 0.059  − 0.160  0.044  − 0.027 
  (0.031)*  (0.033)***  (0.031)  (0.031) 
N  84750  84750  84865  84865 
Grade 6         
Amsterdam  0.175  0.047  0.222  0.144 
  (0.060)***  (0.063)  (0.064)***  (0.050)*** 
Low SES  − 0.024  − 0.117  0.079  0.006 
  (0.032)  (0.029)***  (0.028)***  (0.026) 
N  78378  78378  80200  80200 
Controls         
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School fixed effect  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
Note: Column (1) and (3) control for cohort year, gender, age, age squared and subsidy factor, column (2) and (4) also includes school 
fixed effects.    29 
7  Shaping the testing pool 
The economic literature provides evidence that accountability policies might induce schools to 
shape the testing pool by excluding pupils from the test (see introduction). In this section, we 
investigate various channels for shaping the testing pool: direct exclusion, assignment to special 
education, retention and exploiting exceptions of the testing rules (giving low advices for 
secondary education). 
7.1  Excluding weak pupils 
To investigate the direct exclusion of pupils from the CITO-test we start by analysing the 
changes in the number of pupils for which we do not observe a score on the CITO-test in our 
sample. It should be noted that a missing value on the CITO-test may have many reasons, such 
as non-reporting, illness of the pupils at the time of the test or strategic behaviour of schools. 
Table 7.1 shows the proportion of missing values on the CITO-test by location for each survey 
year for the sample of schools and classes that reported at least one score on the CITO test.
6 
Table 7.1  Missing values on the CITO-test (%) by sample and year of survey in schools that participated 
in the CITO-test 
  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005 
             
Amsterdam (%)  5.4  11.1  13.0  8.4  9.6  5.9 
N  591  440  414  680  876  834 
Low SES sample (%)  7.4  5.5  6.0  8.3  3.5  9.4 
N  2015  1866  2339  2799  2458  2266 
Reference sample (%)  3.6  5.1  4.8  5.5  5.1  8.6 
N  4984  5675  5915  6442  6698  6839 
 
If the accountability policies induced strategic behaviour we might observe relatively more 
missing values in schools in Amsterdam than in schools in the other two samples after the 
implementation of the policies. However, we do not observe such a pattern. In Amsterdam the 
proportion of pupils with a missing value on the CITO-test increased until 1999 but decreased 
afterwards. For the other samples we also do not observe a clear pattern.  
In Table 7.2 we take a closer look at these changes. The first column shows the difference-
in-differences estimate of the effect of the Amsterdam policies on the probability of not taking 
the CITO-test. The estimate shows that after the implementation of the policies the probability 
of not taking the test decreased in Amsterdam compared to the rest of the country with 0.4 
percentage points, which is statistically insignificant. For the Low SES sample the decrease is 
1.2 percentage points. In addition, we checked for changes in the composition of test-takers by 
 
6 For some schools that participated in the CITO-test the scores of all pupils within a class are missing. It seems likely that 
the teachers failed to send the CITO-scores of their classes to the PRIMA-project. We consider these missing values as a 
non-reporting issue and exclude them from the analysis.    30 
exploiting the fact that we have scores on two independently taken tests. We compared the 
scores on the PRIMA-test of the pupils that took the CITO-test and the pupils that did not take 
the CITO-test. For 92 (89) percent of pupils with a missing CITO-score we observe a score on 
the PRIMA language (math) test. Column (2) and (3) show the difference-in-differences 
estimates of the effect of having a missing CITO-score on the scores on the PRIMA-test. The 
DD-estimates for pupils in Amsterdam are positive and statistically not significant. Hence, 
excluded pupils in Amsterdam after the introduction of the accountability polices did not score 
lower but slightly higher on the PRIMA-tests. In sum, the estimates in Table 7.2 do not provide 
evidence that the increase in test scores in Amsterdam can be explained by the direct exclusion 
of (weak) pupils from the CITO-test. 
Table 7.2  Difference-in-differences estimates of the direct exclusion effect 
  Missing CITO  P-math  P-language 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Amsterdam  − 0.004  0.047  0.014 
  (0.022)  (0.167)  (0.144) 
Low SES sample  − 0.012  − 0.001  − 0.071 
  (0.015)  (0.125)  (0.113) 
N  54135  49834  51628 
 
Note: Column (1) shows coefficients of a DD-model on having a missing CITO-score, column (2) and (3) show estimates of DD-models of 
a missing CITO-score on the PRIMA-tests; all models control for year dummies, student characteristics and include school fixed effects. 
 
7.2  Other strategic behavior 
Assignment to special education 
Previous studies show that accountability policies might induce schools to assign more students 
to special education (Jacob, 2005) or to classify more students as disabled (Figlio and Getzler, 
2006). We investigate whether this strategic behavior also occurred in Amsterdam by looking at 
the change in the number of pupils in special education. Table 7.3 shows the proportion of 
pupils of all grades in regular and special education by sample in the period 1995-2005. Special 
education consists of two types: special primary and special education.  
Table 7.3  Proportion of pupils in regular and special primary education 1995-2005 
CITO    1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005 
               
Netherlands  Regular  94.8  94.9  95.0  95.0  94.8  94.8 
  Special   5.2  5.1  5.0  5.0  5.2  5.2 
               
Amsterdam  Regular  92.9  93.2  93.3  93.4  93.3  93.3 
  Special   7.1  6.8  6.7  6.6  6.7  6.7 
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The first rows of Table 7.3 shows that the proportion of pupils in some type of special education 
in the Netherlands is approximately 5.2 % and quite stable over time. For Amsterdam we 
observe a decrease of the proportion of pupils in special education from 7.1 % in 1995 to 6.7 % 
in 2005. Considering this downward trend in Amsterdam it seems not likely that schools used 
the assignment of pupils to special education to increase scores on the CITO test.  
Retention 
An increase of retention might also be a channel for shaping the test pool. An additional year in 
primary education might increase test scores of weak pupils. We investigated this channel by 
comparing the age of pupils in grade 8 before and after the introduction of the accountability 
policies in Amsterdam and in the other samples. Difference-in-difference estimates using the 
same specifications as in the models of the previous sections yield negative and statistically 
insignificant estimates for Amsterdam. Hence, it seems not likely that Amsterdam used this 
channel for improving test scores. 
Not reporting test scores of pupils with a low advice for secondary education 
In 2004 the municipality of Amsterdam decided that pupils with a low advice for secondary 
education no longer had to take the CITO-test
7. Rotterdam took the same decision. This 
decision was based on the argument that the results on the CITO test did not have a predictive 
value for the school career of these pupils. The Dutch media suggested that the exclusion of 
these pupils raised test scores in Amsterdam. As schools themselves give school advices to their 
pupils there is scope for strategic behaviour: by issuing more low school advices schools can 
raise their own average test scores. In addition, schools do not have to report the results of these 
pupils on the CITO-test to the Inspectorate of Education. This provides schools with the 
opportunity to exclude the scores of certain students after they took the test.  
However, it seems not likely that this second channel affects our previous results. First, the 
previous estimates of the performance on the CITO-test are based on the total sample of 
students including pupils who received a low advice for secondary education. In addition, the 
analysis in the previous section showed that the exclusion of pupils cannot explain the increase 
in test scores in Amsterdam. Second, we also found an improvement of the scores on the other 
tests for pupils in Amsterdam. It is not clear why schools would exclude pupils from an 
unpublished test. Third, the municipality of Amsterdam started to exclude pupils with low 
school advices in 2004. However, the increase in performance of pupils in Amsterdam can 
already be observed in the years before 2004. We have no evidence that Amsterdam already 
excluded pupils with a low school advice before 2004. To check this we compared the number 
of pupils in the municipal reports of Amsterdam with the number of pupils that took the test 
according to population data for the period 1999-2003. This comparison showed that the 
 
7 Specifically, pupils with advices for the so-called Practice Education (Praktijk onderwijs, PRO) and the School Career 
Supporting Education (Leerweg Ondersteunend Onderwijs, LWOO).   32 
Amsterdam reports are based on all pupils that took the test which means that they did not 
exclude the (low) scores of students after they took the test.  
In sum, we find no evidence that Amsterdam schools increased test scores by exploiting these 
channels of strategic behavior.    33 
8  Robustness analysis 
To further test the robustness of the results from the previous results we performed several 
sensitivity tests. First, inspection of the covariates in the appendix (see Table A.1) shows that a 
relatively large proportion of pupils in the Amsterdam sample of 1995 has a missing value on 
the subsidy factor. In Table 5.1 these pupils are included in the estimation with a dummy 
variable for missing on the subsidy factor. We excluded these pupils to test the sensitivity of the 
results. The estimates slightly decrease towards 0.448 in the model of column (3) after the 
exclusion of these pupils.  
Second, we checked whether the change in the participation rules for the CITO-test by the 
municipality of Amsterdam in 2004 might affect our findings by excluding all observations 
from 2005. We find that the estimates do not change after excluding all observations from 2005.  
Third, at the start of the first plan ‘Towards better results’ approximately 30 Montessori 
schools refused to participate in the CITO-test. They started taking the test in the school year 
1997-1998 (the CITO-test is taken in February). Hence, they started participating at the cut-off 
between the first and second plan. We investigated the sensitivity of the results by excluding all 
schools (10 schools) in Amsterdam that started participating in the next PRIMA-project held in 
1999. From our data we cannot observe whether schools are Montessori schools. After the 
exclusion of the schools in Amsterdam that entered the PRIMA-project in 1999 we find a 
slightly higher estimate of the effect on the CITO-score (0.492 (0.070). Hence, the results are 
robust for the participation of the Montessori schools.  
Fourth, we investigated a potential ‘large city effect’. In the previous analysis we used two 
nationwide samples as control group. A concern with these control groups is that they might not 
pick up changes in performance in Dutch large cities. To investigate this large city effect we 
compared the change in educational performance in Amsterdam with the change in performance 
in the other three large Dutch cities (Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). Unfortunately, the 
number of schools from these cities in the PRIMA-sample decreased strongly between 1995 
and 2005.
8 Hence, the comparison between Amsterdam and the other three large cities might 
suffer from sampling bias. Table 8.1 shows DD-estimates of the Amsterdam policy for models 
in which the other three large cities are taken as the control group. The left panel shows the 
estimates for the three tests taken in grade 8, the right panel shows the estimates for the PRIMA 
test taken in grade 2, 4 and 6. 
 
 
8 The total number of schools in the sample located in these three cities decreased steadily from 83 in 1995 to 19 in 2005.    34 
Table 8.1  Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam policy using the other three 
large cities as control group 
                    Grade 8                    Grade 2-6 
  CITO  Math  Language  Math  Language 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Amsterdam  0.235  0.244  0.264  0.193  0.165 
  (0.088)***  (0.073)***  (0.063)***  (0.052)***  (0.055)*** 
N  50840  74726  77246  248893  250282 
 
Note: All models include the same controls as used in the full model in column (3) of table 5.1. 
 
The estimates show that for pupils in grade 8 the test scores in Amsterdam improved 0.2 to 0.3 
standard deviation more than in the other three large cities. The size of the improvement on the 
CITO-test is similar to the size of the improvement on the PRIMA-tests. This suggests that the 
improvement of general skills is approximately 0.2 to 0.3 standard deviation which is similar to 
the findings from the comparison with the two nationwide samples. For pupils in grade 2 to 6 
the improvement in Amsterdam is 0.2 standard deviation larger than in the other cities. 
Although the estimates of the effect of the Amsterdam policy on the CITO-test are smaller than 
the estimates found in the previous section the findings on the improvement in the PRIMA-tests 
corroborate a substantial improvement of the general skills of pupils in Amsterdam in all grades 
of primary education.  
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9  Conclusion and discussion 
In 1995 the municipality of Amsterdam introduced accountability policies for schools in 
primary education. Populations statistics show a remarkable increase of test scores after the 
introduction of the new urban policies. This paper assesses this increase in test scores by 
analyzing data of a large sample of schools. Our main finding is that after the introduction of 
the accountability policies test scores in Amsterdam increased more than in two nationwide 
samples. Scores of pupils in Amsterdam increased with 0.4 to 0.5 standard deviation more than 
in the reference sample and with 0.4 standard deviation more than in the Low SES sample. This 
increase confirms the findings from the population statistics.  
We investigated whether the increase in the published test scores was based on an 
improvement of general skills or an improvement in test-specific skills by analyzing the scores 
on two other independently taken tests. The estimates show that pupils in Amsterdam also 
increased their performance on the other two tests but the improvement on these test is smaller 
than the improvement on the CITO-test. Both in math and in languages average test scores in 
Amsterdam improved with 0.3 standard deviation more than in the other two nationwide 
samples. A decomposition of the increase in scores on the CITO-test suggests that 60 percent of 
the increase is driven by an increase of general skills and 40 percent by an increase in test-
specific skills. In addition, we investigated the test scores of pupils in earlier grades. The 
accountability policies only set targets for the performance of pupils in grade 8. We find that the 
performance of pupils in Amsterdam in earlier grades also increased more than the performance 
of pupils in other locations but the improvement in earlier grades is smaller than the 
improvement in grade 8.  
We investigated various channels for strategic behavior of schools: the direct exclusion of 
pupils, assigning more pupils to special education, retention or exploiting exception from the 
test taking rules (giving more low school advices). However, we do not find evidence that the 
use of these channels can explain the increase in test scores in Amsterdam. A robustness check 
focused comparing the change in performance in Amsterdam with the change in performance in 
the other three large Dutch cities confirms the main findings that the Amsterdam policy 
improved general skills of pupils. 
Previous research showed that accountability policies can improve test scores but schools 
will also try to improve their results through strategic behaviour. Against this background the 
results of the accountability policies in Amsterdam seem relatively successful. 
This raises the question which components of the Amsterdam policy are important for these 
positive results. To get insight into this question we discussed our empirical findings with two 
directors of primary schools in Amsterdam. Both directors recognised the improvement in test 
scores after the introduction of the policies. Their main explanation for the improvement was 
that the accountability policies created a culture within schools that was more oriented on 
measuring and monitoring of performance. The directors of schools used this information of   36 
pupils to support and monitor the performance of teachers. Teachers were more careful and put 
more effort in following the individual progress of pupils and started acting when the progress 
was too small. Visser (2003) in his examination of the school choice procedure also notes that 
more than half of the schools in Amsterdam reported in 1999 that they spent more time on basic 
skills in grade 7 and 8. In addition, 40 percent of the schools put more effort in differentiating 
between pupils instead of teaching at the class level. In our view two other components of the 
Amsterdam policy might also have been important. Firstly, the new policy set clear school 
specific short term and long term performance targets and not only focussed on low performing 
schools or pupils. Secondly, the policy was directly related with changes in admission rules for 
tracks in secondary education. The formulation of test score band widths for specific tracks in 
secondary education might have created additional incentives for individual students and their 
parents to put more effort in their education.  
We conclude that our overall assessment of the accountability policies in Amsterdam is 
positive. Although part of the gains in test scores might be test-specific the policies seem to 
have led to a substantial improvement of general skills of pupils in Amsterdam.   37 
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Appendix 1 
Table A.1   Means of test scores and socio-economic background by sample and year of survey 
      1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005 
Prima Math             
Reference  0.19  0.12  0.13  0.09  0.12  0.06 
Amsterdam  − 0.44  − 0.33  − 0.23  − 0.19  − 0.26  − 0.07 
Low SES  − 0.25  − 0.25  − 0.28  − 0.20  − 0.26  − 0.17 
             
Prima Language             
Rest  0.24  0.17  0.19  0.15  0.14  0.11 
Amsterdam  − 0.50  − 0.57  − 0.42  − 0.30  − 0.33  − 0.20 
G3  − 0.34  − 0.35  − 0.39  − 0.32  − 0.29  − 0.28 
             
Controls             
Age             
Rest  11.7  11.9  11.9  12.0  12.0  12.0 
Amsterdam  11.6  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.0 
G3  11.8  12.0  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1 
             
Gender (Girls)             
Rest  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Amsterdam  0.55  0.48  0.52  0.50  0.54  0.52 
G3  0.52  0.51  0.51  0.50  0.50  0.50 
             
Socio-economic subsidy factor           
Reference             
1.0  48.9  52.2  54.8  63.9  67.7  68.4 
1.25  35.5  33.2  28.4  22.4  18.8  15.5 
1.9  8.6  9.9  10.3  10.7  11.3  13.1 
Missing  6.4  4.1  5.6  2.4  2.0  2.7 
             
Amsterdam             
1.0  11.7  16.7  17.4  25.5  23.1  27.3 
1.25  12.3  11.9  11.0  7.9  6.8  5.8 
1.9  52.7  67.6  64.7  64.1  69.2  62.9 
Missing  23.1  3.7  6.9  2.5  0.9  4.0 
             
Low SES             
1.0  12.1  14.3  14.1  22.9  30.5  28.6 
1.25  34.6  32.9  29.3  25.3  24.3  24.0 
1.9  42.7  44.5  50.5  47.8  41.9  44.3 
Missing  9.6  7.4  5.2  3.0  2.0  2.5 
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